Andrew Haesler SCDeputy Senior Public Defender
Why is DNA so important?
DNA Deoxyribonucleic acid - DNA is found in all cells, except red blood
cells. matching can be a wonderful investigative tool for police. DNA evidence
can provide powerful evidence in support of a prosecution case. DNA evidence can
also provide convincing evidence of a person's innocence.
A profile taken from the DNA of a suspect can be compared with the profile of
a sample of DNA taken from a crime scene. A statistically validated 'match' or
'link' between these profiles is compelling evidence that they come from the same
source. It may or may not, depending on the other evidence, be compelling
evidence of guilt. Profiles can be stored on a computer database. They can be
easily cross-checked and any linkage between a crime scene and a suspect's DNA
DNA evidence can however be misunderstood M Findlay & J Grix,
Challenging Forensic Evidence, (2003) 14 Current Issues in Criminal
Justice 269 at 273.. DNA's apparent certainty can be deceptive. It can be
misused and misapplied. It will not of itself solve the crime problem although
the chance of discovery may act as a deterrent Jacobs J in Griffith v
R (1977) 137 CLR 293 at 327, noted: 'The deterrent to an increased
volume of serious crime is not so much heavier sentences as the impression in
the minds of those who are persisting in a course of serious crime that
detection is likely and punishment will be certain'.. DNA evidence is part
of a prosecution case; it is not a panacea. Care is required.
Why do we have to be careful about DNA: the CSI effect
DNA is corroborative evidence. It is particularly useful if supported by
statistics that the chance of someone else other than a defendant leaving the
crime scene stain has a high improbability ratio, such as one in ten billion.
A study of juror's reactions to DNA evidence produced the following
illuminating responses Rhonda Wheate, unpublished PhD thesis, ADF Academy/UNSW,
'DNA is crucial, we want answers, we want it from the scientific
'We rely on the experts, we want answers'.
'How did they convict people in the old days?'
Most of us would admit to similar opinions. We all want evidence and results
that make our already difficult jobs easier. We would love some expert to ease
the burden of judgment by saying, 'this is the answer'.
If only it were that easy. There's still a lot we don't know about DNA 'As
we know, there are known knowns. There are things we know we know. We also know
there are known unknowns. That is to say we know there are some things we do not
know. But there are also unknown unknowns. The ones we don't know we don't
know.' Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defence, Dept. of Defence Briefing,
Washington 12 Feb. 2002. . We need to be acutely conscious of the limitations of
DNA evidence. It can be misused and misunderstood.
The CSI effect refers to the suggestion that jurors who watch fictional crime
scene television programs such as CSI and Law and Order have changed their
requirements for delivering a verdict according to the presence or absence of
forensic evidence. Jenny Wise, Providing The CSI Treatment, Current Issues in
Criminal Justice, vol. 21 no.3 p 383.
The CSI effect has two quite contradictory elements. The first is that jurors
may be overwhelmed by the presentation of expert evidence and convict. This is
especially so where the DNA evidence is inconclusive. There is a tendency of
jury members to overrate DNA evidence. As a consequence the introduction of DNA
evidence may result in more convictions than are warranted. Goodman-Delahunty J
and Tate D (2006) DNA And The Changing Face Of Justice. Australian Journal of
Forensic Science, vol 38, pages 97-106.
The second aspect is where jurors ask for or demand additional forensic
evidence and refuse to convict where there is an absence of forensic evidence.
Franzen R (2002) CSI Effect On Potential Jurors Has Some Prosecutors Worried.
Santiago Union Tribune 16 December 2002.
Journalists in the USA coined the phrase CSI effect in 2002. The media were
quick to attribute a change in attitude of jurors because of the influence of
the television show. In turn academics picked up the issue.
It is clear in my opinion that jurors do expect forensic evidence and do
expect it to be used. What this means for the practitioner is that abundant care
needs to be taken when DNA evidence is called by the prosecution. It also
requires practitioners to have an understanding of how DNA can affect proof in
criminal trials and how it can be misused.
HOW DNA EVIDENCE IS USED
In this paper I look at how DNA evidence is used, and on occasions misused,
in a Local Court context. I do not cover the science or the statistics involved
in DNA analysis or the procedures set out in the Crimes (Forensic Procedures)
Act 2000 (the Act). Reviews of the science, statistics and law can be found
in a number of papers available on the Public Defenders webpage.
What I do here is look at some the following areas 'If I know the answer,
I'll tell you the answer, and if I don't, I'll just respond cleverly',
Donald Rumsfeld again.:
Ruling on the admissibility of DNA evidence.
Assessing expert reports on DNA from the Department of Analytical
Evaluating DNA evidence in context.
A QUICK GUIDE TO SCIENCE AND STATISTICS
Here are 6 points to remember about the science and statistics:
2. There are commercially available kits that allow DNA to be extracted,
processed and converted into a profile that allows for its analysis and
comparison with other samples of DNA.
3. The DNA profile is obtained from only a small fragment of a person's DNA.
As a consequence it cannot be said that the profile is unique.
4. The rarity or otherwise of the profile can be calculated using models
based on statistical 'rules' adjusted to take account of what we know about
5. All models are wrong. Said to be derived from Cox's theorem.
6. No police investigation, expert opinion or scientific process is
infallible: humans are involved.
GETTING SOMEONE's DNA: The Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act
The Act operates as a facilitation mechanism for the collection of DNA and
other forensic material. A good summary of the Act, particularly the provisions
relating to taking samples from children or mentally ill people can be found in
a decision of Simpson J - F V v Zeitler  NSWSC 333.
A Magistrate can order that a suspect provide a forensic sample if certain
preconditions are met (s 24). There must be reasonable grounds to believe that
the suspect has committed a prescribed offence, and there must be reasonable
grounds to believe that the procedure might produce evidence tending to confirm
or disprove that the suspect has committed the offence. The Magistrate must
balance the public interest in obtaining evidence against the public interest in
upholding the suspect's physical integrity, having regard to the following:
(f) such other practicable ways of obtaining evidence as to whether or not
the suspect committed the alleged offence as are less intrusive,(g) such
reasons as the suspect may have given for refusing to consent to the carrying
out of the forensic procedure concerned,(h) in the case of a suspect who is
in custody, the period for which the suspect has been in custody and the reasons
for any delay in the making of an application for an order under this
section,(i) such other matters as the Magistrate considers relevant to the
balancing of those interests.
The Act also allows police to request a suspect to undergo a forensic
procedure. A senior police officer can order that a person under arrest provide
a non-intimate sample (ss.17 to 21). The Act provides for the making of interim
orders where consent is not given or is unable to be obtained and for final
orders to be made by a Magistrate before the sample taken can be analysed.
The Act provides a Code for the taking of samples and other forensic evidence
from a person. The Act is said to strike a necessary balance between the
appropriate use of available scientific means for investigating suspected crime
and the historic rights of citizens against self incrimination. Fawcett v
Nimmo & Anor (2005) 156 A Crim R 431 Grove J at  In
Orban v Bayliss  NSWSC 428, Justice Simpson pointed out that
the Act requires a positive finding that the person to be tested is a 'suspect':
Before a sample can be requested there must be reasonable grounds to believe
that the procedure will produce evidence that will prove the commission of an
offence (s. 11(3)).
Where a Magistrate is asked to make an order or confirm an interim order,
although the initial suspicion is that of the police investigator, the statute
explicitly requires that the Magistrate be satisfied on the evidence before the
Court, not the assertions of the police officer. Fawcett v Nimmo
&Anor (2005) 156 A Crim R 431
A Magistrate considering an application under section 24 can take into
account hearsay material L v Lyons (2002) 56 NSWLR 600 per Sully
J.. The evidence does not have to be in admissible form or even strictly
admissible (eg. hearsay is allowed) as long it is properly before the Court
Hardy v Pinazza, unreported SCNSW, 18.4.2005, Adams
If the matter is reviewed by the Supreme Court (s. 115A) the question to be
asked is whether it was open for the Magistrate to find, on the evidence before
him or her, that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting Simpson J in
Regina v. Rondo  NSW CCA 540 at par 53 summarised the law in
relation to reasonable suspicion:
The Magistrate must articulate the basis on which he or she was satisfied
that the plaintiff was a suspect or a challenge will succeed. Maguire v
Beaton (2005)162 A Crim R 21, per Latham J Similarly, if the Magistrate
fails to articulate the reason why an application was refused a challenge will
succeed. Alessi v SE and Anor  NSWSC 909, Barr J
An example can be found in Maguire v Beaton (2005) 162 A Crim R
21, per Latham J. Her Honour set aside the Magistrate's order for the taking of
the plaintiff's fingerprints and palm prints because there was insufficient
evidence to justify making an order pursuant to s. 24:
The decision was challenged on the basis that the Magistrate's
determination that Mrs Maguire did not come within the definition of
'suspect' for the purposes of s 25(a) of the Act and the Magistrate had not
properly determination that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the
suspect had committed an offence for the purposes of s 25(c).
Justice Latham held that the Magistrate could not have been satisfied as a
matter of law that the plaintiff was a suspect as there was no evidence of
anyone resembling her ever having attended storage unit, nor could she be
identified from surveillance footage at the premises. Mrs Maguire had no
criminal record, she was a woman in her late fifties who had been respectably
employed for some time and she exhibited no trappings of unexplained wealth. At
best there was a suspicion or mere speculation on the part of police that the
plaintiff had leased the unit.
A police officer's assertion of suspicion in the affidavit grounding the
application was not enough nor was a suspicion that the plaintiff may have
leased the unit'.
Again, in Hardy v Pinazza, SCNSW unreported, 18.4.2005
The judgment does not appear on the SC computer database., Justice Adams
overturned the decision of the Magistrate because there was nothing in his
reasons or the evidence that demonstrated he had reasonable grounds for
believing the suspect had committed the relevant offence See also Maguire
v Beaton,  SCNSWi241 per Latham J..
Another example is the decision of Hall J in Walker v Bugden
(2005) 155 A Crim R 416. There his Honour held that before a Magistrate could be
satisfied that there were reasonable grounds for believing that a forensic
procedure might produce evidence, the factual foundation for that belief had to
be established. In short, before a court can order DNA be taken from a suspect,
there has to be some evidence there was DNA from the crime scene to which it
could be compared.
Care must taken to ensure that the strict procedural requirements of the Act
are followed and complied with. The Act is not a carte blanche to
facilitate the placing of everyone's DNA on a database. However, as long as
there is evidence to support the conclusions reached and orders made and they
are made in terms of the Act, a challenge to a Magistrate's order will not
succeed Jawasansher v Johnson LCM  NSWSC 872, per Barr J.
F V v Zeitler  NSWSC 333. per Simpson J..
It is harder again to challenge interim orders. The provisions relating to
interim orders do not have the safeguards that can be found in s.24 (final
orders). Interim orders are intended to preserve evidence that may otherwise be
lost and are by their very nature emergency measures where time is of the
essence. No order (including analysis) may be made unless the requirements of s
24 are met and a final order applying all the safeguards is made. See JW v
Detective Sergeant Karol Blackley & Anor (2007) 172 A Crim R
483, Simpson J
Generally, if there is some flaw in the process, this should be raised to
argue against the admissibility of the evidence at trial: see s 82 and s 138 of
the Evidence Act 1995. Obtaining a order to restrain testing is unlikely
to succeed. Kerr v Commissioner of Police  NSWSC 637 per
Studdert J and JW v Detective Sergeant Karol Blackley & Anor
(2007) 172 A Crim R 483.
The Act cannot be used to compel a person to provide a sample or undergo a
procedure, which is not authorised, e.g. a urine sample. Alessi v SE and
Anor  NSWSC 909, Barr J
The Act can be abused. As a consequence it contains some protections. These
Even if there is other evidence implicating the defendant, DNA expert
evidence is of such importance that there can be substantial reasons, within the
meaning of s.91 Criminal Procedure Act, for attendance of the expert to
give evidence at committal R v Micallef  NSWSC 1172 per
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE
The exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained is a necessary role of the
trial court Kerr v Commissioner of Police  NSWSC 637.. Part
9 of the Act deals specifically with questions of inadmissibility; sections 136,
137 and 138 Evidence Act can also apply. If the strict requirements of s.
24 are not met, then, as noted above, exclusion of the evidence can be
warranted. A failure to exclude evidence can lead to a successful appeal on the
basis that there has been an error of law.
Often the desirability of admitting the evidence the subject of challenge
will outweigh the undesirability of admitting such evidence. If the evidence was
obtained in contravention of the Act R v White  NSWSC 60 per
Studdert J. the failures of the police or others must be carefully examined and
weighed in terms of s.82Which is the equivalent to s. 138 Evidence Act.. As
always with exclusionary provisions, were the discretion of the Court is
enlivened, everything depends on the nature of the impropriety.
The collection of DNA by subterfuge has been allowed and sits outside the
provisions of the Act. The Act does not apply to the chance circumstance that a
suspect throws away an item such as a cigarette butt which is then retrieved
without any reference to, or interference with the suspect, even if that 'chance
circumstances' is manufactured by police desperate for a sample, which may not
have been ordered by a Magistrate DNA has been obtained without recourse to the
Forensic Procedures Act in a number of matters. See R v Kane
(2004) 144 A Crim R 496, R v White  NSWSC 60 per Studdert
J., R v Nicola  NSWCCA 63, where it was
taken from a discarded Styrofoam cup. R v Hun, VSC, 16.6.2000,
Vincent J, where it was obtained from a discarded cigarette butts and R v
Daley,  NSWSC 1211 Simpson J where a discarded RBT tube was used.
Even if a forensic procedure is undertaken illegally, a civil court will be very
reluctant to intervene to prevent the results being analysed. Exclusion of such
evidence should generally be left consideration by the court of trial,
Kerr v Commissioner of Police  NSWSC 637 per Studdert
Other improprieties may not be so readily excused. For example, where police
break into someone's house to steal their toothbrush. Examples of cases where
District Court Judges have excluded unlawfully obtained evidence, or where the
DPP has elected not to offer that evidence, include:
Where the offender's sample, used to match the suspect with the crime scene,
was taken illegally because the suspect was not serving a sentence for a serious
indictable offence at the timeS.62 Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act 2000
before being compulsorily sampled an offender must be serving sentence for
serious indictable offence..
Where a qualified person collecting the sample failed to give information for
consent, failed to caution and failed to provide the suspect with a sample of
his swab Sections 13 (information must be provided to suspect), 46 (suspect must
be cautioned) & 58 (suspect should be given part of sample) Crimes
(Forensic Procedures) Act 2000 - R v Kazzi, Sydney DC,
unreported 28.7.2005, Judge Donovan QCJ)..
Where a sample taken legally from a suspect was not destroyed and its profile
removed from the database within the times required by the Act Part 10, sections
There is an important distinction between sections 82 and 83. Section 82
allows the court discretion to admit the evidence, as with s.138 Evidence
Act. Where material is required to be destroyed section 83 allows no
discretion, 'the results of the analysis, and any other evidence, are
not admissibles. 83(2)..
SECTION 137 EVIDENCE ACT
The fact that scientific evidence is complex does not mean that it will
result in unfair prejudice and exclusion by the operation of s.137 Evidence
Act. Complex evidence must still be received and any conflict of scientific
evidence must be resolved by decision R v Lisoff  NSWCCA
Section 137 is only engaged where the probative value of the evidence is
outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial effect. Unfair prejudice arises where
there exists the probability that the evidence may be misused in some way other
than for the purpose for which it was placed before the court R v
BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 at 139; R v Serratore (1999) 48
NSWLR 101 at , R v Taylor  NSWCCA 194 at  and
Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297 at -.. A
balance, analogous to the exercise of a judicial discretion, must be made of the
evidence's probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice to the
defendant. The task involves consideration of the evidence, the particulars of
the case and the Court's own experience. If the probative value of the evidence
adduced by the prosecutor is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the
defendant there is no residual discretion, the evidence must be rejected. R
v Sophear Em  NSWCCA 374 and R v Blick, (2000) 111 A
Crim R 326.
Section 137 thus could not be used to avoid determining an issue such as
complexity but it could be used, as it was in R v Sing (2002) 54
NSWLR 31 (see below), to say that a DAL report without evidence to support it
was inadmissible. Courts should be scrupulous in ensuring that samples collected
by subterfuge are properly handled and the procedures in place for collecting
lawfully ordered swabs be followed. Courts must be alert to the danger of
contamination, accidental or deliberate. If unfair prejudice exists because of
the way an exhibit is handled the exclusion of the evidence is
It is important to note that unless the Act requires destruction of a sample
or an order ruling the evidence inadmissible is made there is no provision for
ordering the destruction of samples or profiles taken pursuant to the Act.
Charara v Commissioner of Police  NSWCA 22 at
THE DNA REPORT
The standard report prepared by the Department of Analytical Laboratories is
usually brief and to the point 'I'm not into this detail stuff, I'm more
concepty', Donald Rumsfeld again.:
The explanatory note that accompanies the report contains these important
As with all legal documents it pays to read the fine print!
The report simply notes the results of the analysis. It does not describe the
process by which the result was obtained. In R v Sing (2002) 54
NSWLR 31See also R v Ryan  VSCA 176., the Court of Criminal
Appeal held that, unless admitted by consent, the evidence from the expert who
prepared the final report itself was not admissible. To make the evidence
admissible, the chain of custody and handling of the exhibit from which the DNA
was taken and analysed must be proved - from collection of the sample to final
This means that, unless the defence do not require them, everyone who
handled, processed and analysed a sample should be called for cross-examination.
The rationale for the decision was the danger of unfair prejudice that might
arise if relevant witnesses were not called. A related issue was whether the
expert's conclusions, reliant as they were on hearsay, were admissible in any
Recently the NSW police have taken to referring-out analysis of crime scene
samples to a private DNA analysis firm. The DAL report simply notes that these
outsourced samples have been compared to the results obtained in the DAL
laboratory. The Report provides no assertion, or evidence of, no continuity
between the crime scene sample and the subsequent analysis. It simply purports
to report the results of matters, which were not even analysed in the same
laboratory! The Report would not be admissible except by consent.
Another shortcut involves the service and tender of DAL forms indicating that
a crime scene sample has been matched on the database with a particular offender
profile. This note does not even purport to be an expert report however the
prosecution rely on it as proof that the suspect did, as a matter of fact, leave
the sample found at the crime scene.
The standard report does not contain sufficient material to found its
admission over objection. The opinion rules. 76 Evidence Act. precludes
the reports admission unless it can be shown that the opinion in it is
substantially based or the author's training study or experiences. 79
Evidence Act. These requirements were dealt with comprehensively by
Justice Haydon in Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52
NSWLR 705 at ..
Despite these potential problems in many cases the defence will allow the
report to be tendered without objection or it will be tendered pursuant to s.177
Evidence Act. There should be more challenges. Evidence particularly
relating to the collection and handling of DNA samples or exhibits from which
they are taken should not be accepted uncritically.
EVALUATING DNA EVIDENCE IN CONTEXT
Impressive statistics can indicate that it is unlikely that another person
would have the same DNA profile as the defendant and the crime scene stain.
Where that statistical certainty is challenged careful attention needs to be
paid to the nature of the challenge. If the prosecution has not excluded the
possibility of the accused having a sibling or other relative who may have left
the sample, or where the expert called cannot support the statistical or
population genetics behind their opinion, then the apparent certainty of the
model used may be undermined.
So too, if there is other evidence that contradicts the DNA results. Examples
recently accepted by juries (or the DPP in no-billing matters) include alibi and
where the victim's description of the offender simply failed to match in any
reasonably acceptable way the description of the person matched by DNA linkage
to the crime.
There is fertile ground for cross-examination of both police and DNA analysts
in the following areas.
Most police forensic officers are well-trained professionals but not all
exhibits are collected by trained professionals. Sometimes pressure of work or
cost cutting can lead to unacceptable shortcuts being taken. Examples of
improper techniques that can lead to contamination of DNA samples include,
improper bagging and storage of exhibits - e.g. bundling them all in a bag or
back of the car, transfer of DNA by fingerprint brushes, tweezers, or gloves
which were used on more than one item. A recent study by the DAL showed how a
disposable glove can pick up DNA from a woman's handbag and transfers it to a
plastic bag containing drugs.
As DNA profiles can be obtained from such small amounts of body tissue or
fluid, it is often hard to avoid cross-contamination of samples in the lab or
when the sample was collected. Inquiry into the Circumstances That Led to the
Conviction of Mr Farah Abdulkadir Jama 29 March 2010, where the
contamination occurred at the hospital when the complainant's sample was
contaminated by samples taken at an earlier unrelated examination in the same
procedure room. Another example is the case of Mr Gesah in Victoria. He was
arrested for a cold case murder only to have his charges dropped a week later
when it was found the crimes scene samples had analysed at the same time and
place as an earlier sample he had provided in relation to an unrelated matter.
The Age 22 July 2008 and 8 August 2008.
It would be naïve to assume that all police can resist the temptation to
plant evidence. There is still so much we don't know about DNA and statistics
and population genetics, in the particularly areas of linkage between genes The
best illustration is that some traits are not independent, for example, blonde
hair and blue eyes. and interrelatedness. Illustrated by R v
Bropho  WADC 182.
Handling errors because of the conditions in which the DNA is kept or stored.
It is surprising how many samples, numbers and barcodes do not match with
numbers and barcodes recorded in notebooks or exhibit books.
That, as we are dealing with statistical models, a chance match cannot be
excluded (N.B. the possibility of a chance match increases if relatives or those
from certain racial groups may be involved).
The possibility of tampering with the crime scene. This is not to impugn the
police or Laboratory staff. Other criminals could have left the sample and it
would be naïve to assume that all police can resist the temptation to plant
The suspect's sample could have arrived at the crime scene for a number of
innocent reasons - secondary transfer or prior contact with the scene or
Because DNA technology allows only for comparison of computer-generated
profiles of the two samples of only a tiny fragment of DNA, There are over three
billion pieces in the DNA code. The Profiler Plus system looks at only 10
segments of that total code. unlike fingerprints, where there is an actual
physical comparison between the fingerprint found at the scene and that of the
suspect or defendant.
The danger that the statistical significance of a DNA match has been
overstated. Some of the risks attaching to DNA evidence are only now becoming
apparent. 'The highly subjective nature of the mathematical process remains
concealed behind the apparent certainty of a bald statistic', Mathew Goode,
'Observations on evidence of DNA frequency'(2002) 23 Adelaide Law Review
45 at 66-67. Examples include; the Eichelbaum-Scott report on DNA in New Zealand
in 1999 The Rt Hon Sir Thomas Eichelbaum and Professor Sir John Scott, Report on
DNA anomalies for The Hon Tony Ryall, New Zealand Minister for Justice, 30
November 1999, the inquiry in Victoria into how a female crime victim's DNA was
found in the Jaiyden Leskie murder, the Gesah case The Age 22 July 2008 and 8
August 2008 and the more recent problem of contamination in Mr Jama's case.
There are also problems arising from the number of what are called 'unresolved
pairs' often found when the databases are searched for unexplained matches.
Forensic DNA Evidence Interpretation, Buckleton, Triggs &
Walsh CRC (USA) 2004 page 463. In 2005 Walsh and Buckleton reviewed Aboriginal
DNA data bases for the National Institute of Forensic Science, in an unpublished
report 'on Duplicate detection' they noted that out of a sample group of 33,858
there were 1,575 matches, 206 occurred at 9 loci or greater. They explained
these as being; coincidental matches between unrelated individuals, the same
person giving more than one sample underran alias, close relatives matching or
identical twins matching. The report also noted that in New Zealand a similar
review had found 64 unresolved matches from a database of 50,000 people. Where
DNA is the only evidence or is critical to the case against the defendant,
significant care must be taken when evaluating its efficacy in proving the
WHEN DNA IS THE ONLY EVIDENCE
When the Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act 2000 (NSW) was introduced
the Police Minister Paul Whelan was explicit: Hansard, NSW Legislative
Assembly, 31 May 2000, p 6293.
In R v Pantoja, (1996) 88 A Crim R 554 at 559, Hidden J
agreeing. Justice Hunt made the same point.
Although our understanding of DNA has advanced since 1996, the point still
remains valid. A DNA link or match between the accused and a crime scene stain
demonstrates only that the accused could be the offender. It does not establish
that he was the offender.
In Pantoja Justice Abadee J Ibid at 583 and 584. put it much
more empathically. He held that the tribunal of fact must first be satisfied
beyond reasonable doubt that there is a match between the two profiles. That
means only that the defendant cannot be excluded and therefore it is possible he
left the crime scene stain. Further, the matching results could not, in the
absence of other evidence, prove beyond reasonable doubt the defendant was
responsible for the crime scene stain.
Victoria adopted a similar approach to NSW and their Court of Appeal has held
that DNA profiling established no more than that the accused could be the
offender: R v Noll  3 VR 704 at . That being said in
July 2008 after a trial in the Melbourne County Court Farah Abdulkadir Jamal was
convicted of rape and sentenced to six years gaol after his identity was
'established' by DNA found on a swab said to have been taken from a women who
claimed she may have been raped while she was unconscious after collapsing at a
night club. The jury rejected Mr Jamal's alibi and convicted despite there being
no evidence he had been anywhere near the women or the nightclub. A subsequent
judicial enquiry found that Jamal's DNA had been allowed to contaminate the
crime scene sample because of faulty collection procedures at the hospital
In R v Watters,  EWCA Crim 89. it was emphasised that
there was no rule, that when the statistics reached a certain level a prima
facie case could be established. Rather, it was emphasised that the DNA evidence
must be evaluated in the context of the other evidence in the case.
Pantoja was decided in 1996. Courts have subsequently expressed
greater confidence in DNA and how it is presented. In R v Galli,
the Chief Justice said: (2001) 127 A Crim R 493 at .
There have been strong statements in support of the proposition that DNA
should be treated like fingerprint evidence which has been held to be good
enough to justify a conviction on this evidence alone: R v Rowe 
SASC 427 at  (SA CCA). R v Galli (2001) 127 A Crim R 493 at  per
In most cases I have reviewed there is some other evidence, insufficient of
itself to prove guilt, which the DNA evidence corroborates. Examples include:
R v Gum  SASC 311, where there were similarities in
appearance between the accused and the alleged rapist; R v
Fitzherbert  QCA 255, where there was evidence of animosity and
contact between the accused and the victim; R v Butler  QCA
385 where the evidence was DNA and opportunity and R v Weetra
 SASC 337 where the accused lived nearby and stolen property was found
near his home.
Prosecutors still however persist in bringing cases based solely on DNA
evidence without anything to support it other than a brief DAL report and no
other evidence at all. In a recent example the evidence consists of the DAL
report where there was no evidence of continuity of samples and outsourced
testing and a description of the attacker as a 15 year old Caucasian boy. The
accused was a 25 year old Aboriginal man who the police could not prove was even
in the State at the time!
I have yet to find a superior court decision where DNA alone has been used to
convict: eg where the Crown could not prove the defendant was in Australia at
the relevant time. The case of Forbes comes close.
On 11 March 2005 at about 10.00pm a young girl was walking home from work
along a Canberra bike path. She was attacked, indecently assaulted and forced to
perform fellatio on her attacker. She described her attacker as being in his
late 30's and noted his penis was circumcised. Male DNA was found on her body
and semen was recovered from her clothes. A DNA profile of her attacker was
obtained. It was later matched to the profile of Mr Forbes. Forbes lived in
Canberra. Although the victim failed to identify Forbes from a photo-board
display he was arrested and went to trial. He was convicted despite his denials
and alibi evidence.
Forbes appealed his conviction on the ground that the conviction was unsafe
as the only evidence identifying him as the attacker was the DNA profile match.
The ACT Court of Appeal rejected his appeal : R v Forbes
 ACTCA 10. The High Court did not allow leave to appeal on the conviction,
as it was open to the jury to convict on the defendant's evidence and other
evidence such as identification: Forbes v The Queen  HCA
Forbes is one of a number of case where the barest hint of
other evidence and a DNA link between a defendant and a crime scene, to a very
high probability, has been used to convict. An example is R v
Rowe: a police officer could at best give a general description of his
assailant but where blood, from which was recovered DNA linked to the accused,
was found on the officer's shirt. As such it was not strictly a DNA only case,
although it came very close. Doyle CJ said:
I note that despite this view where DNA is the only evidence, the usual, but
not exclusive practise, of the NSW Director of Public Prosecutions is to no-bill
the matter. The NSW police will however generally try it on.
Recently Magistrate Heilpern in R v Le Platrier  NSWLC
22, was asked to consider the question. However, evidence that the defendant had
a brother meant that rather than the chance of someone else having the crime
scene profile was reduced from 1 in 10 billion to 1 in 6252. This was, as Mr
Blair for the accused pointed out, the equivalent of tossing a coin 12 or 13
times and getting heads. His Honour held that there was a reasonable doubt
because given these odds the prosecution had not negatived the hypothesis that a
brother of the defendant shares the same DNA profile as the defendant and was
thus the perpetrator of the crime.
A similar case where both the Magistrate and the District Court Judge on
appeal, convicted is to be heard in the Court of Criminal Appeal on 1 November
2010: Wayne Talay v R. This appeal may resolve the issues ducked by the High
Court in Forbes.
Cases where DNA is the only evidence are understandably rare, but are
becoming more common as more and more serious offenders are placed on the
offenders’ database. It was reported in The Advertiser of 28/8/2008 that South
Australia had 41,161 profiles on its database, a 100% increase on a year before.
Cold links are now being made, between crime scene stains and this database,
with increasing frequency. Examinations of “cold cases exhibits” have turned up
nuclear DNA from exhibits over 10 years old, see R v Stone (2004) 144 A Crim R
568. Stone pleaded guilty in 2004 to a 1990 murder. Sometimes cases are
presented to court solely on the basis of this link. More often the link leads
to further investigations and other evidence such as admissions, opportunity,
identification or motive is presented. The DNA link then provides powerful
corroboration of that other evidence.
A DNA match shows only that it is possible to a very high degree of
probability that the defendant is the person responsible for leaving the stain.
Despite the power of the statistical analysis that accompanies DNA testing I
argue this can never be enough to prove a case beyond reasonable doubt in the
absence of some other evidence for the DNA to corroborate. As the court said in
Pantoja all the DNA match or link shows is that they could be the offender. In
most, if not all, cases there will be good reasons why the mere fact of a match
and the giving of a high match probability cannot be viewed with the certainty
necessary of itself to prove the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt.
Where the prosecution can point to no other evidence to support or
corroborate their case against the accused, the case cannot be proved to the
necessary high standard. Where there is some other evidence, common sense leads
to the conclusion that before a case can be proved beyond reasonable doubt all
relevant evidence (DNA and otherwise) must be considered in context. These
matters have been taken up and applied as part of the Victorian Judges’ Bench
Notes which, at para. 126.96.36.199, Charge: DNA Evidence note:
“Even if you accept (the expert) evidence, that does not necessarily mean
that the accused must be guilty of the offences charged. It is just one piece of
underlying circumstantial evidence that must be considered in the light of the
other evidence in the case. You will remember…it is important that you recognise
the limitations of DNA evidence. People sometimes think that such evidence can
prove who committed an offence. This is wrong. DNA evidence can never establish
a person’s guilt. All that DNA evidence can do is prove that the accused could
have been the person…it cannot prove that she/he definitely was that person. In
other words, the DNA evidence given by expert witness cannot rule out the
possibility that someone else was responsible for the (forensic sample). To
address the possibility that someone else was responsible for the (forensic
sample) expert witness also gave evidence about the probability that the DNA
taken from the sample would match the DNA of a random member of the
population…This does not mean that NOA is (state relevant part of ratio, eg 5
million) times more likely to have committed the offence than a person chosen
randomly…You must consider all of the evidence in this case and decide whether
it is possible that someone other than the accused could have been responsible
for the (forensic sample)”. A useful starting point for submissions to a court
considering DNA evidence comes from the leading South Australian decision of R v
Karger (2002) 83 SASR 135, per Doyle CJ at 140-141. See my paper “DNA in Court
2009” at pages 15 & 16, available of the public defenders webpage.“The
statistical evidence is undeniably strong evidence pointing to a conclusion that
the accused was the source of the incriminating DNA, but is not direct evidence
of that fact. And, as is obvious, the statistical evidence must be considered in
the light of other evidence in the case.”
CONCLUSIONDNA is just evidence. It is another piece of
A DNA profile however is not real. It is a scientific and statistical
construct. Even if the statistics are good questions can arise about how the
match came about. This is an area we as lawyers know and understand as it
involves questions of proof, evidence and weight of evidence. Often the question
is not, “Whose DNA is it?” but “How did the DNA get there?”
While the CSI effect is real it can be overcome. Like all physical evidence
DNA can be used, misused and abused. As with any piece of evidence, care must be
taken to place that evidence in context and assess its weight, not in terms of
statistics but with regards to how it relates to all the other evidence in the
Andrew Haesler SCCarl Shannon ChambersSeptember 2010